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Technological Non-Co-operation: 
Britain and Airbus, 1965-1969
Frances LYNCH
Lewis JOHNMAN
Anglo-French co-operation to build the world’s first civilian supersonic aircraft,
Concorde, was a rare example of the British and French governments working
together to challenge American hegemony in a field of advanced technology.1
Although the British Labour government, foreseeing the commercial disaster
which Concorde was to prove, seriously considered withdrawing from its
supersonic treaty obligation on several occasions in the 1960s it was as committed
as its Conservative predecessor which had signed the supersonic treaty, to
co-operating with France in the joint production of aircraft. Indeed in February
1965 it proposed to France that the two governments should sponsor the production
of a new wide-bodied aircraft soon to be called Airbus, designed to cater for the
rapid expansion of air travel in the 1970s and beyond. This was to form part of the
European Technological Community which the Labour Prime minister, Harold
Wilson hoped would accompany Britain’s entry into the European Economic
Community. Although Britain had the technological capability of building on its
own both the aero-engines and the airframe for such an aircraft it needed access to
the finance and markets which co-operation with France and other European
countries could offer. That the future survival of the British aircraft industry
depended on its co-operating with its European partners in commercially sound
ventures was recognised by the Plowden Commission which had been set up by the
Labour government to advise it on its policy towards the aircraft industry.2
The situation in France and West Germany, Britain’s prospective partners in
Airbus, was different. While France had an increasingly successful airframe
construction industry, and shared Britain’s interest in co-operating for commercial
and financial reasons, due to the technological backwardness of its aero-engine
industry, it relied on importing aero-engines from the United States. West Germany
relied wholly on importing American aircraft under the offset programme. One fear
of the British government was that both France and West Germany would continue
to import aero-engines from the United States rather than act as junior partners in
making them with Britain and could even be seduced by American firms into
co-operating with them rather than with Britain, to build airframes. As a result the
British hopes of achieving the functional integration of the European aircraft
industry and of British membership of the EEC would not be achieved. The
American Administration, whilst a long-standing advocate of British membership
of the EEC did not support the British government’s ambition to create a European
1. We are grateful to David Edgerton for helpful comments on an early revision of this paper.
2. Cmnd. [Command papers] 2853. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Aircraft Industry
appointed by the minister of Aviation under the chairmanship of Lord Plowden, 1964-1965.
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aircraft industry. The American aircraft corporations were equally opposed. The
purpose of this article is to explain why the British government took the decision to
withdraw from Airbus leaving the French company Sud Aviation, in partnership
with the West German conglomerate, Airbus AG to build the first Airbus. In view of
the subsequent success of the Airbus fleet in challenging Boeing’s monopoly
position in world markets, the British government’s decision of 1969 has been
described in retrospect as ‘without doubt one of the stupidest industrial policy
decisions ever made by a British government’.3 In the mid 1960s France accounted
for just 3.7 per cent of the non-communist world’s aerospace output in comparison
with 7.4 per cent for Britain and 82 per cent for the United States.4 Today the
Airbus site in Toulouse is the largest aeronautical complex in Europe.
It was Roy Jenkins who, as minister of Aviation in the first Wilson government,
proposed in February 1965 to his opposite number in Paris, Marc Jacquet, that the
two governments should co-operate to build a wide-bodied aircraft to cater for the
rapidly-growing demand for air travel in Europe.5 The proposal to the French,
made within weeks of the Labour government’s failure to cancel Concorde, was
one of several such co-operative ventures in aircraft production, the rest being in
the military sector. Pre-empting the conclusions of the Plowden Committee,
co-operation with France and other European countries was seen as the only way to
ensure the survival of the British and European aircraft industry in a world
dominated by the USA. But co-operation with France on aircraft production had an
even greater significance. Since January 1963 when Charles de Gaulle had vetoed
Britain’s first application to join the European Economic Community it was
understood in London that France remained the obstacle to British entry into the
EEC. Any action which improved relations between Britain and France was seen to
offer some hope of overcoming de Gaulle’s hostility to British membership.
Technological expertise was one area in which Britain had, or more importantly
was seen to have, something positive to offer to France and the rest of the European
Community. This was particularly important in view of the concern increasingly
being felt in Europe at the time about a growing technological gap with the United
States.6 For Prime minister Wilson technology was not only the force which would
revive the British economy but it was also a possible passport for British entry into
the EEC.7
3. Association pour l’étude des problèmes sociologiques, économiques et stratégiques liés aux
techniques nouvelles, Evolution de la compétitivité de l’industrie aéronautique française.
Comparaison-internationale et intersectorielle: 1970-1980, Paris, 1983, p.171.
4. M. LYNN, Birds of Prey. The War Between Boeing and Airbus, Heinemann, London, 1995, p.115.
5. National Archives, London, (hereafter referred to as N.A.) FV 2/234. Note of an Anglo French
ministerial meeting held in London on 16 February 1965.
6. This was to be popularised in the best-selling book by J.-J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER, Le défi
amércain, Denoël, Paris, 1967.
7. J.W. YOUNG, Technological Co-operation in Wilson’s Strategy for EEC Entry, in: O.J.
DADDOW (ed.) Harold Wilson and European Integration. Britain’s Second Application to Join
the EEC, Frank Cass, London, 2003.
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It was for this reason that he broached the subject of aircraft co-operation with
de Gaulle when he visited Paris in April 1965 - the first such visit by a British
Prime minister since de Gaulle’s veto of 1963. Playing on de Gaulle’s fears of an
American domination of Europe he explained the British offer to collaborate on
aircraft production in terms of the need to reduce British dependence on the United
States.8 The offer was welcomed. Committees were set up to draft the
specifications for a wide-bodied aircraft capable of carrying large numbers of
people over short distances - soon to be called Airbus. By December 1965
agreement had been reached to construct an aircraft with between 200 and 225
seats powered by two engines and ready for service by 1974. This in itself was a
compromise between the French wish for a larger aircraft based on their
predictions for the expansion of air travel and the more conservative British
estimates. Indeed one British official suggested that when the Channel Tunnel was
completed air travel would decline significantly.9 Where no agreement was reached
was on the choice of engine supplier. Indeed the failure of the French to endorse
Rolls-Royce from the outset was to be one of the reasons for the British
government’s subsequent decision to withdraw from Airbus. At that time the
engines for Concorde were being designed and built by the French corporation, the
Société Nationale d’Etude et de Construction de Moteurs d’Avions, (SNECMA),
and the American aero-engine firm Pratt & Whitney which had a non-majority
shareholding in SNECMA, and the Bristol-based Bristol Siddeley engines. The
condition for Pratt & Whitney’s participation in SNECMA was that the French firm
could not co-operate with Rolls-Royce. To break that condition would have caused
SNECMA to lose lucrative American defence contracts. The Macmillan
government, in its haste to sign the Concorde Treaty, had little choice but to agree
to give the contract for the engines to Bristol Siddeley and SNECMA rather than to
Rolls-Royce.10 British officials were now not so ready to overlook the interests of
Rolls-Royce. Unhappy with the French suggestion to adopt for Airbus whichever
engine Boeing was to choose for its new large-scale carrier the Jumbo-jet B 747,
designed to carry a pay load of up to 500 passengers, they insisted that studies
should be undertaken into the relative merits of the Rolls-Royce RB 178 and the
Pratt & Whitney JT9D engine, regardless of Boeing’s decision.11
Nonetheless Rolls-Royce’s chances of selection received a blow when Boeing
announced that it had chosen the Pratt & Whitney JT9D engine for its B 747. As far
as the French were concerned this tipped the scales strongly in favour of selecting
the same American engine for a twin-powered Airbus. As they saw it the JT9D
engine would have the advantage of two years service on the B 747 which was
8. N.A. PREM 13/324. Visit of the Prime minister and the Foreign secretary to Paris, 2-3 April 1965.
9. Archives Nationales, Paris (hereafter referred to as A.N.) Ministère des Travaux Publics et des
Transports (MTPT) 760 069/91. Report of meeting, 16 October 1965. (Work on the Channel
Tunnel did not begin for another 20 years).
10. L. JOHNMAN, F.M.B LYNCH, A Treaty Too Far? Britain, France and Concorde, 1961-1964,
in: Twentieth Century British History, 3(2002), pp.253-276.
11. A.N. MTPT 760 069/91. Note of a meeting between Fred Mulley and Edgard Pisani, 7 April 1966.
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scheduled to fly in 1970. SNECMA’s share of the cost of manufacturing the JT9D
was put at 371 million francs as compared with 649 million francs for the
Rolls-Royce engine. The Pratt & Whitney engine would have greater sales and the
French firm SNECMA would derive technological benefits from its participation in
the general research and tests for the JT9D engine.12
Disappointed that it had lost out to Pratt & Whitney for the contract to make the
engine for the Boeing 747 and outraged that it seemed likely to be squeezed out of
the home market as well by the choice of an American engine for the Airbus,
Rolls-Royce announced a take-over bid for Bristol-Siddeley in June 1966.13 The
French reacted to the news with alarm recognising that it placed SNECMA in an
even weaker position relative to the British aero-engine industry. Their reaction
became a second reason for Britain’s withdrawal. The news increased the resolve to
strengthen the French airframe construction industry and contributed to the
decision, announced at the beginning of September 1966, to select Sud Aviation as
the French participant in Airbus.14 Since Sud Aviation had also been given the
contract for Concorde the French decision to concentrate civilian projects in one
firm, in contrast to the British defence-inspired policy of spreading government
contracts around,15 was to enhance Sud Aviation’s chances of assuming a
leadership role over the European airframe construction industry. The British
government, having given the contract for Concorde to the British Aircraft
Corporation (BAC) had, before the French had selected Sud Aviation, decided to
offer the airframe company Hawker Siddeley the option to work on Airbus. But
with the future of Concorde continuously in doubt and with the cancellation by the
government in April 1965 of its other major project, the Tactical, Strike
Reconnaissance Aircraft (TSR-2) BAC was left in a potentially vulnerable
position.16 Its efforts to build a successor to its successful jet, the BAC 1-11, was to
provide a further reason for the British decision to withdraw from Airbus.
In June 1966 the two main airframe constructors in the United States, Boeing
and Douglas, contacted the French and German airframe constructors to propose
making an Atlantic Airbus together. While the French thought the offer should be
left in reserve in case the negotiations to build a European Airbus broke down, the
Germans greeted the American offer enthusiastically.
The British were understandably suspicious of the American firms’ motives in
the timing of their offers and saw in the French and German response to them the
possibility of an Atlantic Airbus being constructed without the British. This, Sir
12. A.N. MTPT 760 041/121. Programme ‘Airbus’: Situation créée par le choix du moteur Pratt &
Whitney JT9D pour équiper l’avion Boeing 747, no date.
13. P. PUGH, The Magic of a Name. The Rolls-Royce Story, Part Two: The Power Behind the Jets
1945-1987, Icon Books, Duxford, Cambridge, 2001, pp.96-97.
14. N.A. FO 371/190864. Memorandum from T.J.B George, 5 September 1966.
15. Ph. GUMMETT, Civil and Military Aircraft in the UK, in: History and Technology, 9(1992),
pp.203-222.
16. Ch. GARDNER, British Aircraft Corporation. A History, Batsford Ltd., London, 1981,
pp.108-119.
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Con O’Neill, an under secretary in the Foreign Office, ruefully concluded, would
suit the Treasury and British European Airways (BEA) who 
‘will cheerfully kill the Airbus and for that matter the British aircraft industry, in the
faith that the economy would be the healthier without both of them’.17
While waiting for the Americans to flesh out their offers the contractors chosen
for Airbus by France, West Germany and Britain were asked to calculate their
costs. From the outset the cost of Airbus was a major consideration for the British
government. Determined not to repeat the mistakes of Concorde and strengthened
by the recommendation of the Plowden Report the government made commercial
viability one of the criteria against which its involvement and support for any
aircraft was to be judged. Thus when the contractors chosen for Airbus delivered
their costings to the governments in autumn 1966 alarm bells began to ring in
London. The greatest cause for concern was the fact that the industrialists expected
governments to cover the launching costs, subsidise the costs of production and
carry any commercial risk. In calculating the degree of commercial risk much
depended on estimates of the size of the market, and the size of the plane. The
industrialists specified a plane with a seating capacity of between 250 and 270 but
which would later be stretched to 300, to meet a total world market demand of
between 460 and 660 aircraft of which over half would be in the United States.18
Officials in the British ministry of Aviation did not believe that the break-even
number of 300 could be sold, and concluded that Airbus would not be
commercially viable.19 The Germans, who had been invited to participate in Airbus
at the beginning of 1966 and who were even more optimistic about the growth in
air travel than the French, urged the French to go ahead without the British.
But, for the British to withdraw from Airbus, within weeks of Wilson’s
announcement to the House of Commons that it was his government’s intention to
seek membership of the EEC, was seen as a disastrous course of action by the
Foreign Office. Indeed Wilson himself had stressed the link between technology
and British membership of the EEC in a widely-reported speech in the Guildhall.20
It seemed inconceivable that Britain should choose such a time to announce its
withdrawal from Airbus. The concern of the Foreign Office was that it should at
least be represented on the Official Committee on Technology when it met to
discuss Airbus early in 1967.21 To its relief the discussions on that committee
focussed on trying to find ways of making the Airbus more viable commercially
rather than recommending British withdrawal from it. In recognition of the
argument that a British withdrawal from Airbus might affect the French and
German attitude to British entry into the Community the ministry of Aviation
17. N.A. FO 371/90862. Memorandum from Sir Con O’Neill, 22 June 1966.
18. N.A. FO 371/190864. Letter from T.T. Lidbury, deputy chairman and managing director of
Hawker-Siddeley Aviation Ltd. to Sir Christopher Hartley, ministry of Aviation, 14 October 1966.
19. N.A FO 371/190864. ‘Airbus’. Joint report to ministers, December 1966.
20. J.W. YOUNG, op.cit. For text of speech see U. KITZINGER, The Second Try: Labour and the
EEC, Pergamon, Oxford, 1968, pp.307-310.
21. N.A. FO 371/190864. Memorandum from T.J.B. George to R.J. Priddle, 29 December 1966.
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suggested that the British government could propose that a smaller Airbus with a
maximum of 200 seats could be built. This it could argue would be more viable
commercially since it would not compete with any new American aircraft.22 But
this was rejected by the cabinet committee. Another proposal asking the three
national contractors, Sud Aviation, Hawker-Siddeley and the German conglomerate
Airbus AG to contribute to the launching and production costs, was also rejected on
the grounds that while the French and German companies might make such a
financial contribution, the British firm would not.23
In the end it was left to Wilson to raise the issue with de Gaulle when he visited
Paris on 24-25 January 1967 as part of his tour of European capitals designed to
win support for Britain’s bid for membership of the EEC. The contradiction
between Wilson’s enthusiasm for the technological contribution which Britain
could make in the EEC and the more detailed debate inside government was
stark.24 In the event the British need not have worried about this contradiction since
de Gaulle made it clear that in his opinion, borne out also by the experience of
working together on Concorde, it was not necessary for Britain to be a member of
the Community for technological co-operation to take place.25 Wilson’s hopes of
progressing towards membership of the EEC were dashed and Airbus had now, like
Concorde, to be seen as merely national co-operation. An important, probably the
politically most important reason for it, had been removed. It had to stand or fall on
commercial and technological grounds. Was there in these circumstances a strong
case for participating in Airbus?
The ministry of Aviation remained convinced that the commercial prospects
were too poor for the aircraft to meet the Plowden Report’s recommendation. With
the ministers responsible for aviation from Britain, France and West Germany due
to meet in Bonn on 27 January 1967 to take a decision about Airbus it looked as if
Britain might withdraw. Four days before the meeting Sir Denning Pearson, the
chairman of Rolls-Royce, met with Sir Solly Zuckerman, the government’s chief
scientific adviser. The timing of the meeting was not accidental since Rolls-Royce
wanted to influence the outcome of the meeting in Bonn. Revealing some of the
complexities of the politics of aircraft manufacture Pearson explained to
Zuckerman the implications for Rolls-Royce of recent developments in the United
States. The Lockheed Corporation, having been told that it was no longer in the
running to build the American supersonic plane then under consideration, decided
instead to turn its energies to building a medium-range airbus with a seating
capacity of 250-300. Boeing, still in the supersonic race, was postponing a decision
on an airbus. As Pearson explained Rolls-Royce had decided that it stood a strong
22. N.A. CAB 134/3313 Cabinet Official Committee on Science and Technology. International
Appraisal by Officials of industrial proposals for a European Airbus. Note by the ministry of
Aviation, 6 January 1967.
23. N.A. CAB 134/3313. Cabinet Official Committee on Science and Technology. Minutes of a
meeting of the committee, 11 January 1967.
24. N.A. CAB 164/96. Memorandum from N.M Fenn, 20 January 1967.
25. N.A. CAB 128/42. Conclusions of a cabinet meeting, 26 January 1967.
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chance of being selected as the engine maker for the Lockheed airbus and was
anxious that its chances were not undermined by a decision taken in Bonn to select
its rival, the Pratt & Whitney JT9D engine before Lockheed had made its choice.
Were Lockheed to select an American engine in preference to a Rolls-Royce one,
Zuckerman thought that ‘the European airbus would [then] be a waste of resources
and commercial nonsense’. If on the other hand Lockheed chose a Rolls-Royce one
he then considered that there would be room for Europe to develop a twin-engined
Airbus and if Lockheed opted for a similar plane it might offer to co-operate with
Europe on it. The conclusion to this reasoning was that Britain should do
everything to prevent ministers at Bonn from selecting Pratt & Whitney engines for
Airbus.26
John Stonehouse, who had replaced Fred Mulley as minister of Aviation, duly
represented the interests of Rolls-Royce at the tripartite ministerial meeting in
Bonn. In the face of French insistence that no further time should be lost before
deciding to adopt the Pratt & Whitney JT9D engine for the Airbus, reserving the
Rolls-Royce one for a second generation Airbus – a position which Germany
supported – Stonehouse insisted that a decision on the choice of engine should be
postponed. Reluctantly it was decided to ask the airlines themselves to state their
preference and to meet again in the middle of March to decide on the choice of
engine.27
Fairly predictably when the airlines were asked to state their preference BEA
opted for the Rolls-Royce engine for technological reasons (more modern
technology, quieter engine) and for political reasons (it was a ‘European’ engine).
The other four airlines consulted, two French and two German, all preferred the
JT9D on the grounds that it would benefit from three years’ experience as the
engine for the Boeing 747 which both Air France and Lufthansa would use. Air
France and Air Inter were concerned about the length of time which it would take
to produce the Rolls-Royce RB 207 engine (which had replaced the RB 178) and
Air France was not prepared to accept an aircraft equipped with an RB 207 engine
if, once its seating capacity was increased to 300, the running costs were no longer
as low as those of the JT9D.28
In this situation the British government remained hopelessly divided. On one
side were the Treasury and Board of Trade, both opposed to British participation in
Airbus. The Treasury considered the Airbus to be motivated more by questions of
international prestige and emotional appeals about the future of the European
aircraft industry than by sound economic and commercial judgements. The Board
of Trade condemned it for not even meeting the immediate needs of BEA. On the
other side was the Foreign Office, pointing out that, although British participation
in Airbus was not central to Britain’s application to join the EEC, were Britain to
26. N.A. CAB 164/96. F.H Allen, 24 January 1967. Note of a meeting in the Cabinet Office, 23
January 1967.
27. A.N. MTPT 760 069/91. Report of meeting in Bonn, 27 January 1967.
28. A.N. MTPT 760 069/91. Airbus: point des discussions internationales, 20 February 1967.
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withdraw from Airbus such action could not but detract from the argument that
Britain’s entry into the EEC would bring technological benefits. Somewhere in the
middle the ministry of Technology under Anthony Wedgwood Benn, tried to dodge
the issue by making the adoption of the Rolls-Royce engine a pre-requisite for
Britain’s participation in Airbus, without facing up to the question of whether
Britain should participate in an Airbus if it did have Rolls-Royce engines. The
Official Committee on Science and Technology finally gave its conditional support
to British participation in Airbus (albeit with dissentions from the Treasury
representatives).29
This paved the way for the cabinet itself to endorse British participation in the
first phase of Airbus, but the decision was evidently dependent on the savings on
imports which Airbus promised as well as on the export earnings accruing were
Rolls-Royce to be successful in winning the Lockheed contract. Interestingly,
ministers were of the opinion that the same engine, the RB 207, was being
proposed for both the Airbus and the new Lockheed jet. Ministerial agreement was
also conditional on the initial capacity of the Airbus not exceeding 250 seats.30
News that an agreement to proceed with a European Airbus seemed likely was
not well-received in Washington. Reflecting the view of many American officials
the assistant secretary for Industrial affairs in the US department of Transportation
intimated to Sir Solly Zuckerman that Britain ‘should leave advanced technology to
the United States and concentrate (its) efforts on humdrum manufacturing
industry’.
Opinions of this kind were bound to prolong the British venture. As Sir Solly
Zuckerman said 
‘it is hard to imagine how they can be so naïve as to think that the United Kingdom
and Europe could afford to abandon precisely those fields which are essential for
economic growth and not to see the political impossibility of writing off our invest-
ment in advanced research and development over the past 20 years’.31
The main concern of the French was to get an assurance that if they agreed to a
Rolls-Royce engine Rolls-Royce would then collaborate with SNECMA not only
on Airbus but on other projects as well so that SNECMA would not suffer from
breaking its contract with Pratt & Whitney. The French were not prepared to accept
that leadership over the airframe should go to Hawker-Siddeley nor that the three
governments should study the expansion of the project to include a three-engined
lay-out, such as Lockheed was proposing. But these were minor defeats in what
29. These conditions were: that there was an assured market in the three national airlines; that the
launching costs did not exceed the present estimate of £130 million and would be re-examined at
an early stage with the aim of securing a significant reduction; that there was an assurance that the
target operating costs of 30 per cent below current types and the in-service date of 1972-73 would
be achieved; and that the manufacturers would make a proper financial contribution covering
normal production costs and some 20 per cent of development costs. N.A. CAB 134/3309. Cabinet
Ministerial Meeting on Science and Technology, 22 February 1967.
30. N.A. PREM 13/1939. A. Wedgwood Benn to H. Wilson, 13 April 1967.
31. N.A. PREM 13/1939. Sir Solly Zuckerman to H. Wilson, 16 May 1967.
Technological Non-Co-operation: Britain and Airbus, 1965-1969 133
was otherwise seen as a very positive outcome as far as the British were concerned
especially in view of the fact that on 2 May 1967 the House of Commons had voted
massively in favour of the British application to join the EEC (488 in favour, 63
opposed).32
Whatever optimism it engendered in London though was soon to be shattered
by de Gaulle. In a press conference held on 16 May 1967 he reiterated all his
criticisms of Britain’s bid for entry into the EEC which he argued, would cause
‘nothing but destructive difficulties’.33 When Wilson met de Gaulle in Versailles on
19 June 1967 he stressed the point that both countries should become independent
of American technology. Evidently still hoping to prise open the door to EEC
membership he told de Gaulle that
‘Britain had the best aero-engines in the world and that if France and Britain com-
bined they could compete effectively with the United States. The airbus they hoped
to make was potentially a good example of this in regard both to engines and air-
frames’.34
However when the results of a two-month design study into the Rolls-Royce RB
207 engine seemed to confirm that it was the best engine in a two-engine layout the
reaction in Britain was ambivalent. Wedgwood Benn and the ministry of
Technology now saw the optimum solution for Rolls-Royce and for Britain as
being the adoption of a different engine, the RB 211 which was being offered to
Lockheed, in a three-engined rather than a two-engined European Airbus. But they
recognised that, were Britain to drop the RB 207 in the hope that the RB 211 would
replace it in a three-engined Airbus, the danger was that the resultant delays might
scupper the chances of a European Airbus altogether. Other no more welcome
consequences of cancelling the RB 207 could be that the French and Germans
would switch back to the Pratt & Whitney engine or that Britain would lose
contracts for both the RB 207 and the RB 211 engines. A further complication
arose from the fact that French support for the RB 207 engine was based on
SNECMA being involved in its manufacture. Were the RB 207 to be abandoned in
favour of the RB 211 Wedgwood Benn felt that any involvement of SNECMA in
the RB 211 would jeopardise the chances of that engine ever being adopted in
America. Another problem, which was recognised belatedly, was that if Britain
supplied the engine for Airbus, France would demand leadership over the
airframe.35
With the three governments due to take a decision on 25 July 1967 on whether
or not to embark on the ‘Project Definition Stage’ of Airbus, the British
government had to make a decision one way or another on the RB 207 and on the
Airbus. The comments and advice circulating within the Cabinet Ministerial
Committee on Science and Technology at that time revealed no small measure of
32. N.A. PREM 13/1939. John Stonehouse to H. Wilson, 12 May 1967.
33. N.A. PREM 13/2646. Sir P. Reilly to Foreign Office, 16 and 17 May 1967.
34. N.A. PREM 13/1731. Record of conversation between Wilson and de Gaulle, 19 June 1967.
35. N.A. CAB 134/3309. Memorandum from A. Wedgwood Benn to the Cabinet Ministerial
Committee on Science and Technology, 17 July 1967.
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distrust tinged with bitterness towards the French, due to the fact that technological
joint initiatives were not bringing Britain nearer to entry into the EEC. Wedgwood
Benn argued that Britain should not enter into any further collaborative agreements
with France until it had been accepted as a member state of the EEC. Douglas Jay,
president of the Board of Trade and a strong opponent of membership, stressed the
importance of SNECMA not obtaining ‘technological information which they
might exploit on their own account if the Airbus were cancelled’. In summing up
the discussion within cabinet Wilson confirmed that the British government was
prepared to proceed to the ‘Project Definition Stage’ of Airbus in the hope that it
could persuade the French and Germans to keep open the option of a three-engine
design at least until October/November 1967 when the Lockheed decision was
expected, and in the hope that Britain could win leadership over the airframe or the
formation of a joint company.36 The chances of Britain achieving any of these
ambitions was slim which could only strengthen the position of those opposed to
British participation in Airbus within the cabinet.
The French on the other hand were prepared to commit themselves to the full
project on the sole condition that it would be reviewed in the light of unforeseen
circumstances. All three governments accepted the conclusions of the Directing
Committee of Officials that the RB 207 engine was satisfactory. On the issue of
who should assume overall control of the project the Germans pressed for the
creation of a joint company to reflect the political initiative behind the project.
However while the French accepted this as a long-term objective they argued that if
the Airbus was to meet its in service date of 1973 there was insufficient time to set
up an official joint company. The British had to concede this point, as did the
Germans although for the British the issue was to ensure that they would not
always be excluded from the leadership over the airframe simply because they
would have leadership over the engines. Nonetheless the French won control for
Sud Aviation over the airframe37 and in September 1967 the three governments put
their signature to a Memorandum of Understanding on Airbus setting out the terms
agreed at the July ministerial meeting.
Airbus was scheduled to fly in 1973 but both BEA and Air France needed an
aircraft to cover their medium range flights before then. In Spring 1966 BEA had
announced that it would need a new interim plane if it was to survive until the
arrival of the Airbus. Unlike Air France which could theoretically downgrade its
Boeing 707 from long-haul to medium and short-haul routes to cover the period
between the end of the Caravelle and the arrival of the Airbus, BEA had no
long-haul planes. Furthermore, the British government refused to allow BEA to
purchase the American plane best suited for its needs, the Boeing 727-200 with 160
seats. The only wholly British solution was to adopt an existing plane – the VC10
short-haul with 210 seats or a stretched Trident. But so great was the cost of such
36. N.A. CAB 134/3309. Minutes of a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Science and Technology,
25 July 1967.
37. N.A. CAB 164/96. Memorandum from John Stonehouse, 26 July 1967.
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an adaptation that the British government was anxious to persuade other European
countries to buy it too and postpone the arrival of the Airbus.38
By the end of June 1966 both the French and German governments had flatly
rejected a British plane for the interim period judging that it would be less
economical than the Boeing 727-200 and would arrive one year later. Another
option considered by the British government was to support BAC in constructing
the BAC 2-11, an aircraft with 185 seats powered by two Rolls-Royce RB 211
engines. Once again the government was divided over whether or not to support the
BAC 2-11. Those in favour, who included Anthony Crosland, now president of the
Board of Trade, argued that the BAC 2-11 would be an all-British aircraft using
British engines which would sell well outside Britain particularly following the
devaluation of sterling in November 1967. Moreover since the engines which BAC
proposed were the same Rolls-Royce RB 211 engines which were being offered to
Lockheed for its Tristar, it was argued that were the British government to support
the BAC 2-11 this would improve Rolls-Royce’s chances of winning the contract to
supply Lockheed, thereby breaking into the lucrative but highly protected
American market.39 The counter argument advanced by Zuckerman was the fear
that the French might object to the British government lending its support to an
aircraft which could be a potential rival to the Airbus. The French had already
objected strongly to the fact that Rolls-Royce was developing the RB 211 engine in
the hope of winning the Lockheed contract as well as the RB 207 engine for
Airbus. Sud Aviation had even sent a delegation to the Rolls-Royce factory at
Derby to check out its capacity for handling two major engine programmes and
returned perturbed that a major effort was being made on the engine design for the
American aircraft to the detriment of the engine for the European aircraft.40 As
Zuckerman argued 
‘it would be disastrous if Rolls-Royce’s activities were to irritate the French to the
extent that they pull out of the airbus, if at the same time the company proves unsuc-
cessful in the American market. That way we would get the worst of both worlds.
[…] At the moment the European horse looks more like a starter’.41
Wedgwood Benn was unequivocal in his support for Airbus. As he pointed out
the only way that any European country could hope to meet the challenge of
American domination was through a policy of co-operating and market sharing.
With total demand in the western world for civil aircraft over the ten-year period
1967–1976 estimated at about £15,000 million he claimed that 
‘a properly organised European aircraft industry supported by co-ordinated Euro-
pean purchasing policies could obtain more than a third. The British share could be
£2,750 million’.
38. A.N. MTPT 760071/122. Notes sur l’Airbus, 10 April 1967.
39. N.A. CAB 134/2608. Cabinet Ministerial Committee on the Aircraft Industry. Paper from A.
Crosland, 8 December 1967.
40. N.A. PREM 131/1939. Sir S. Zuckerman to H. Wilson, 10 November 1967.
41. N.A. CAB 164/765. Sir S. Zuckerman to H. Wilson, 10 November 1967.
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He went on to contrast this figure with the £1,500 million which the British
aircraft industry on its own could expect to earn on the basis of past performance.
He had no doubt that
‘the best long-term future for the British aircraft industry and the best sure outlet for
Rolls-Royce engines, lies in co-operation with Europe. This in turn will strengthen
engine sales’ prospects in the USA; Rolls-Royce itself could not expect to survive
without a European airframe industry’.42
Convinced of the logic of the argument and undeterred by de Gaulle’s second
veto of the British government’s application to join the EEC the cabinet committee
took the decision to continue to back the Airbus and not to give any financial help
to BAC to enable it to develop the BAC 2-11.43
However just when British policy seemed confirmed developments across the
Atlantic destabilised it once again. At the end of March 1968 Lockheed decided to
select the Rolls-Royce RB 211 engine to power its Tristar jet. As soon as the news
came through the minister of Aviation, Stonehouse, wrote to the French and Germans
assuring them that the RB 211 order would ‘in no way result in any lessening of our
support for the European Airbus with RB 207 engines’. The two aircraft, the
Lockheed long-range jet and the Airbus medium-range jet would be ‘complementary
and not direct rivals’ he insisted, adding that the British government was confident
that Rolls-Royce had the capacity to make engines for both.44 While the French did
not share this confidence what they most objected to was the discovery that the
British government had allowed a private airline, Air Holdings Ltd, to place orders for
the Tristar.45 This they argued would influence the rest of the Commonwealth to buy
the Lockheed jet rather than the European Airbus.46
A potentially more serious threat to the Airbus came in May 1968 when Boeing
announced its intention of building a medium-range airbus with between 200 and
250 seats, designed to compete directly with the European Airbus.47 The
confidence of the British government in the ability of Airbus to compete with
Boeing evaporated instantly. With the deadline for the three European governments
to make a definitive commitment to Airbus - 31 July 1968 - fast approaching, panic
set in London. Wedgwood Benn suggested that the British government should
insist on a four-month extension period to see whether Airbus’ costs could be
reduced.48 Many others in cabinet expressed the hope that Airbus would be a
42. N.A. CAB 134/2608. Cabinet Ministerial Committee on the Aircraft Industry. ‘BEA
Re-equipment’. Memorandum by A. Wedgwood Benn, 11 December 1967.
43. N.A. CAB 134/2608. Cabinet Ministerial Committee on the Aircraft Industry. Confidential annex,
12 December 1967.
44. A.N. MTPT 76071/122. Letter from J. Stonehouse to J. Chamant, 29 March 1968.
45. Air Holdings Ltd. was in fact a shadow company set up by Rolls-Royce with the help of Lazards
and other financial institutions in the City. Its sole purpose was to place orders for the Lockheed
Tristar and thereby enable Lockheed to obtain orders from three airlines as required before its
launch. N.A. PREM 15/004. Frederick Corfield to E. Heath, 4 December 1970.
46. A.N. MTPT 760071/122. Letter from J. Chamant to J. Stonehouse, 8 April 1968.
47. A.N. MTPT 760071/122. J. Stonehouse to J. Chamant, 5 June 1968.
48. N.A. CAB 134/2609 A. Wedgwood Benn to Cabinet Ministerial Committee on the Aircraft
Industry, 24 May 1968.
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casualty of the political crisis engulfing the Fifth Republic at the time.49 Better
informed observers explained that since the two main French trade unions, the
Confédération Générale du Travail and the Force Ouvrière were both publicly
backing Airbus a decision to cancel it and cause significant industrial
unemployment was unlikely.50 Jenkins, who as minister of Aviation had first
proposed collaborating on the Airbus with the French, now as chancellor of the
Exchequer, wanted Britain to withdraw immediately.51 It was Lord Chalfont, the
British ambassador to France, who warned of the political damage which would
arise if Britain pulled out of Airbus while France and Germany still wanted to go
ahead. ‘It must’ he said,
‘postpone for a very long time indeed the moment when European countries will
again seriously contemplate engaging in industrial collaboration with us’.52
Political ‘events’ in France did have an impact on Airbus although not in the
way that ministers had predicted or hoped. When Maurice Couve de Murville
replaced Georges Pompidou as Prime minister in July 1968 he immediately
appointed Henri Ziegler as chairman of Sud Aviation.53 Ziegler, an aeronautical
engineer clearly had a better grasp of aircraft manufacture than his predecessor,
Maurice Papon, a former police chief later condemned for his actions during Vichy.
Ziegler was in favour of Wedgwood Benn’s proposal to have a four-month
extension period on Airbus. During that time with Sud Aviation in a position of
leadership over the airframe for Airbus, he completely changed the design of
Airbus arguing that the original one was technical and commercial nonsense.54 The
new design which was unveiled on 9 December 1968 was for a smaller Airbus, now
called the A300B, with a seating capacity of 200-250 seats and powered by two
engines. These engines were no longer to be the RB 207 ones but more powerful
versions of the RB 211 which Lockheed had demanded for an enlarged Tristar.
While Ziegler recognised that to use the RB 211 engine would mean a saving on
development costs for Airbus he re-opened the possibility that Airbus might use
American engines instead.55
Although in many respects the revised Airbus, the A300B, was closer to the
specifications which the British had originally proposed, officials remained
sceptical about its commercial prospects, and particularly its chances of breaking
into the American market. They also challenged the argument put forward by the
French and Germans that the redeveloped A300B still fell within the spirit of the
49. N.A. CAB 134/2609. Cabinet Ministerial Meeting on the Aircraft Industry. Minutes of meeting,
30 May 1968.
50. N.A. AVIA 65/2169. Telegramme from B. Ledwidge, Paris Embassy, to Foreign Office, 17 July
1968.
51. R. CROSSMAN, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, vol.3, 1968-1970, Book Club Associates,
London, 1978, p.152.
52. N.A. AVIA 65/2169. Lord Chalfont to A. Wedgwood Benn, 16 July 1968.
53. I. McINTYRE, Dogfight. The Transatlantic Battle over Airbus, Preager, Westport Connecticut,
1992, pp.22-23.
54. N.A. FCO 46/409. F.C.K. Gallagher to I.L. Crosthwait, 29 November 1968.
55. Financial Times, 11 December 1968.
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Memorandum of Understanding of September 1967 even though it was no longer
committed to using Rolls-Royce engines. To give themselves greater negotiating
power the British officials on the Airbus directing committee maintained that a new
situation did exist outside of the Memorandum of Understanding which meant that
all options could be explored. If the engine could be changed so too could the
airframe they argued.56 One reason for taking this position was that BAC, having
failed to win government support for the BAC 2-11 aircraft had begun work on a
240 seat BAC 3-11 aircraft using two RB 211 engines.
Whatever the French and Germans thought, as far as the British were concerned
the debate on Airbus had been re-opened. Jenkins, as chancellor of the Exchequer
lost no time in making an explicit link between industrial and social policy. On 11
December 1968 he made it clear that if Airbus were cancelled he would remove his
earlier objection to the continuation of welfare milk. The following day Wedgwood
Benn told the House of Commons that the government was making no commitment
to either the Airbus or the BAC 3-11 or to any new proposal (although the ministry
of Technology had calculated that with the help of sub-contractors from other
European countries the British government’s financial support for the BAC 3-11
would be well below the figure envisaged for the Airbus).57 Such a reversal of the
minister of Technology’s earlier policy of support for Airbus infuriated the Foreign
Office, who saw the decision facing the British government no longer as simply
one of whether or not to collaborate with Europe but whether or not to enter into
direct competition with Europe.58
On 5 February 1969 the German cabinet took the decision to build the A300B
Airbus preferably on a tripartite basis but with France alone if the British refused to
join.59 The manner in which the Germans had taken their decision and then
pressurised the French and the British to make up their minds, greatly irritated
Wilson. At a meeting in Bonn with Kurt Kiesinger, the federal chancellor, Wilson
expressed his surprise that the Germans had announced their decision to go ahead
with the A300B ‘apparently before they had assessed the state of the market and the
sales prospects of the aircraft’. Explaining that the British government attached
importance to European co-operation in aircraft to ensure for Europe a degree of
independence from the United States and to avoid a drain of foreign exchange
expenditure on aircraft he stressed that ‘British governments had made too many
expensive errors in aircraft developments […] to wish to make such a mistake
again’. The hastiness of the German decision might, he feared, make it harder for
governments now to negotiate suitable terms with industry. Pointing out that the
British government’s decision not to go ahead with the original Airbus, the A300,
in the summer of 1968, against the wishes of the French and Germans, had been
vindicated, Wilson now argued that the BAC 3-11 deserved to be considered
56. N.A. FCO 46/410. Cabinet Official Committee on the Aircraft Industry. ‘European Airbus’. Note
by the ministry of Technology, 18 December 1968.
57. N.A. FCO 46/411. Note by J.R.S. Guinness, 5 February 1969.
58. N.A. FCO 46/410. Note by J.R.S. Guinness, Defence Policy Department, 10 January 1969. 
59. N.A. CAB 164/765 A. Wedgwood Benn to H. Wilson, 10 February 1969.
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seriously, ‘even if only as a touchstone against which to measure the merits of the
A300B’.60
The ministry of Technology advocated deferring a British decision on the
A300B for six months to give BEA time to complete its assessment of the
competing projects and to give BAC and Lockheed time to reach a decision about
possible collaboration.61 But the lack of realism of such advice was made all too
evident when the French cabinet decided to support the Airbus but to defer a
decision on financing it for three to four weeks in order to give the Commissariat
au Plan time to determine what would need to be sacrificed in order to
accommodate it. Forced to make a decision the British cabinet took the ambivalent
one on 25 March 1969, that Britain should not participate in the Airbus project, but
that the minister of Technology should be free to re-open the decision ‘if the terms
on which Britain was offered participation were to be changed materially’.62 On 29
April 1969 Wedgwood Benn wrote to Wilson suggesting that the government
should reverse its decision in order to enable Britain ‘to stay in the market for this
sort of aircraft’. He went on to propose that the government should give launching
aid to Hawker-Siddeley to help it with its work on the wings for the Airbus. Furious
when he learned of Wedgwood Benn’s proposal, Jenkins wrote to Wilson arguing
that nothing had changed to make the economics of Britain’s participation in the
Airbus any more attractive than when the cabinet had decided against it. He was
firm that ‘because of its poor market prospects it would be quite wrong to risk
government money on developing a part of it’.63 He could have added that it was
the politics of Britain’s participation in Airbus which had changed since two days
earlier de Gaulle had resigned as president of the Fifth Republic. With the major
obstacle to British membership of the European Community now removed British
participation in Airbus was now not so necessary for political reasons.
If the British government refused to finance the construction of the wings for
the A300B for which Hawker-Siddeley had already done most of the design work,
and with doubts over the technical competence of any other firm to step into the
breech, Franz-Josef Strauss, minister of Defence in the West German government
decided to arrange financial help for Hawker-Siddeley. Motivated partly by a wish
to see Airbus succeed and partly by a wish to defend the aerospace industry in his
Bavarian constituency, Strauss offered Hawker-Siddeley a deal whereby West
Germany would finance 60 per cent of the development costs of the wing
(amounting to £100 million) in return for which the British company would sign a
fixed-price contract to supply the wings for the aircraft.64 Hawker-Siddeley had in
essence become a sub-contractor with no say in any decisions.65 On 29 May 1969
the French and German governments signed an agreement to establish Airbus
60. N.A. PREM 13/2484. Meeting between H. Wilson and K. Kiesinger, in Bonn, 13 February 1969.
61. N.A. FCO 46/411. Note of a meeting in the Ministry of Technology, 11 February 1969.
62. N.A. PREM 13/2107. R. Jenkins to H. Wilson, 13 May 1969.
63. N.A. PREM 13/2107. R. Jenkins to H. Wilson, 13 May 1969.
64. M. LYNN, op.cit., p.115.
65. McINTYRE, op.cit., pp.24-26.
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Industrie. This entered into force on 13 August 1969. Airbus Industrie was known
in France as a ‘groupement d’intérêt’ (GIE) – a commercial partnership rather than
a company, it was not obliged to publish accounts, nor to pay tax. It pooled the
capital contributed by its members who in turn were not free to produce any aircraft
which competed with the Airbus product range.66 According to the agreement of 29
May 1969 the two governments were to base their choice of engine for the Airbus
on technical, industrial, commercial and financial grounds. At the end of August
Sud Aviation and Deutsche Airbus recommended the adoption of the American
General Electric engine, rather than a Rolls-Royce or Pratt & Whitney engine.67
On 23 October 1969 the French inter-ministerial committee took the decision to
adopt the General Electric engine but stressed that the decision was not to be made
public until SNECMA had secured the best possible deal with the American firm.
The Germans, who had shown the greatest belief and determination to get the
Airbus built, were happy to comply with the French decision. The nightmare
scenario envisaged by the new Pompidou presidency was that were the
Rolls-Royce engine to be adopted for Airbus it would be Airbus Industrie rather
than the British government which would end up paying for it, as well as paying
Hawker-Siddeley to make the wings for Airbus. In addition the French government
would end up paying for Concorde while the British government relieved of all
expenditure on Airbus and Concorde, would develop the BAC 3-11 on its own to
compete with the Airbus.68
It would be easy but misleading to explain the British government’s decision to
withdraw from Airbus in 1969 in terms of the failure of Britain’s second attempt to
join the EEC and to set up a technological community in Europe. The reasons were
more complex and involved issues of cost, tensions between the interests of the
airframe construction industry and those of aero-engines, attempts by the American
firms, Lockheed and Boeing with the backing of the US Administration, to
undermine Airbus before it could present a challenge to their own aircraft in the
future. Even after de Gaulle had made it clear that British membership of the EEC
was not a necessary pre-condition for technological co-operation to take place, the
British commitment to Airbus was retained. It was the doubts about the commercial
viability of the Airbus particularly when Boeing announced its intention of building
a direct competitor with it which caused the British government reluctantly to
withdraw. These doubts were reinforced when, under the leadership of Sud Aviation,
the design of the Airbus was changed radically in the space of four months. The final
straw came when the French and the Germans refused to guarantee, mainly for
commercial reasons, that the revised Airbus would be powered by Rolls-Royce
rather than American engines. Airbus had failed to secure British membership of the
EEC, had failed to provide a secure market for British aero-engines, had failed to
give leadership over the airframe to a British firm and finally failed to be a wholly
European aircraft able to challenge American hegemony.
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